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I.

INTRODUCTION

The socioeconomic and political instability that permeated Colombia
during the first half of the twentieth century, particularly during La
Violencia, gave rise to the armed conflict that persists to date.1 Peasant
 Juris Doctor Candidate, 2014, Florida International University College of Law. I want to
thank my faculty advisor, Professor M.C. Mirow, for his invaluable help and guidance, and Marisol
Floren for her assistance with research. I also want to thank my parents, Libardo and Lourdes Velez, for
their unconditional love and support.
1
ANGEL RABASA & PETER CHALK, COLOMBIAN LABYRINTH: THE SYNERGY OF DRUGS AND
INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY 23 (2001) [hereinafter RABASA, ET AL.,
COLOMBIAN LABYRINTH].
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farm workers, or campesinos, armed themselves and revolted against the
elitist government.2 The underlying causes of the popular unrest were
grievances over socioeconomic issues and demands for an agrarian or land
reform.3 The leftist guerrilla insurgency emerged in this environment of
political unrest and violence.4 During the second half of the twentieth
century, the drug boom heightened the violence in Colombia.5 Guerrillas
and large landowners were at war over control of the illicit drug trade.6 To
resist the guerrillas, landowners formed their own counterinsurgent group:
the paramilitaries.7 Both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries became the
actors of brutal attacks against the civilian population.8 Their violent acts
and their war over territorial control resulted in massive displacement.9
With six million displaced innocents, the government enacted the Law
of Victims and Land Restitution in 2011.10 It promised the “integral
reparation” of the victims of forced displacement.11 As part of the integral
reparation, the Law of Victims promises the return of lands to displaced
victims and seeks the socioeconomic stabilization of the victims upon
return to their lands.12 Also, the Law of Victims provides a warranty of no
repetition, by which it promises that the victims will not be subject to
forced displacement again.13 The Law of Victims seems ideal, and its
implementation is necessary for the adequate compensation of individuals
who have suffered the most as a result of the internal conflict.
However, the Law of Victims faces substantial challenges to its
implementation. First, the environment of socioeconomic inequality in
which the internal conflict is rooted still exists.14 The Law of Victims
2

See infra Part II (A).
See generally DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF
ITSELF 185-87 (1993).
4 For the proposition that the leftist guerilla insurgency was a new phenomenon during the period
known as La Violencia, see id. at 223.
5 Id. at 249.
6 CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, BACKGROUND ON COLOMBIA: LONGESTRUNNING CIVIL WAR IN THE AMERICAS, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=400 (last
visited Oct. 29, 2012).
7 Id.
8 See infra Part II (B)-(C).
9 See infra Part III.
10 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 71 (Colom.).
11 Id. at art. 25; Abecé de Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras [ABC of the Law of Victims
and
Land
Restitution],
EL
UNIVERSAL
(Colom.),
Mar.
19,
2012,
http://www.eluniversal.com.co/cartagena/bolivar/abece-de-ley-de-victimas-y-restitucion-de-tierras69429.
12 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 73, ¶ 3
(Colom.).
13 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 25.
14 For the proposition that Colombia experiences an unequal distribution of agricultural land, see
3
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offers a series of measures that attempt to provide for the socioeconomic
stabilization of the victims upon return, but the established measures are
ineffective. Second, the internal conflict in Colombia continues,15 making
the restitution of lands impossible in areas where the illegally armed groups
retain control.16 Even if the process of land restitution proves successful,
the victims are still exposed to violence in those areas. Last, illegally armed
groups continue to plant landmines in areas under their control.17 Colombia
is already the subject of a serious landmine problem, and the presence of
mine fields places a substantial burden on the restitution of lands. On
account of the foregoing, the Law of Victims faces the danger of achieving
only symbolic significance. The Law of Victims is ideal for a post-conflict
environment, but the internal conflict in Colombia is far from its end.
Certain measures can be taken in order to overcome some of the challenges.
And, unless the Colombian government adopts a necessary implementation
plan or alternative measures, the Law of Victims will not achieve its
purposes. In the interest of the victims, governmental action is urged to
address the existing issues in order to overcome the burdens in achieving
land restitution.
II. COLOMBIA’S ARMED INTERNAL CONFLICT
Colombia has been the subject of an armed internal conflict for the last
fifty years.18 The internal conflict is rooted in a long history of inequality.19
Peasant farm workers demanded an agrarian or land reform that would have
modified the unequal pattern of land tenure, and the controlling elite failed
to implement such reforms that would have addressed the agrarian
problem.20 Colombia experienced an era of turmoil in which illegally
David L. Attanasio and Nelson Camilo Sanchez, Return within the Bounds of the Pinheiro Principles:
The Colombian Land Restitution Experience, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 44 (2012). For the
proposition that the internal conflict is mainly rooted in the socioeconomic inequality resulting from the
high concentration of land distribution, see Nadia Margarita Rodriguez, Land Restitution in Colombia,
GLOBAL DIALOGUE, http://isa-global-dialogue.net/land-restitution-in-colombia-2/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2012).
15 LISA HAUGAARD, LATIN AMERICA WORKING GROUP EDUCATION FUND (LAWGEF), ET AL.,
STILL A DREAM: LAND RESTITUTION ON COLOMBIA’S CARIBBEAN COAST 1 (2012), available at
http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Still_a_Dream.pdf; see also Rodriguez, supra note 14.
16 See Rodriguez, supra note 14.
17 Anastasia Moloney, Caring for Colombia’s Landmine Survivors, 373 THE LANCET 2013, 2013
(2009),
available
at
http://download.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140673609610953.pdf?id=aaa0r_9up2ATbf_p
XTAtu; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: COLOMBIA (2012), http://www.hrw.org/worldreport-2012/colombia [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012].
18 Oliver Kaplan & Mike Albertus, Colombia’s Rebels and Land Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/opinion/colombias-rebels-and-land-reform.html?_r=2&.
19 CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6.
20 Garry
Leech, Fifty Years of Violence, COLOMBIA JOURNAL (May, 1999),
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armed groups, the guerrillas specifically, emerged.21 Subsequently, the
paramilitaries, another illegally armed group, emerged in reaction to the
guerrillas.22 The battle against each other and against the government
created a wave of violence that has resulted in massive displacement.23
Despite the demobilization of some of these groups, the violence in
Colombia persists.24
A. The Political Instability that Led to the Arming of Peasants
The Conservative Party controlled Colombia’s politics between 1880
and 1930.25 The Conservative hegemony ended in 1930, when the Liberal
Party assumed control of politics until 1946.26 While the Conservative
Party was composed of members of the elite, peasant farm workers and the
lower class supported the Liberal Party.27 The parties’s ideological clash
and political tactics led to much friction between them,28 which resulted in
vast outbreaks of violence.29
During Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo’s term in office (1934-1938), the
country experienced popular unrest over socioeconomic issues.30 Workers
sought social reforms.31 Scattered instances of agrarian unrest were
occurring throughout the country.32 These instances appeared in the form
of peasant occupation of unused parts of private land, conflicts over land
titles, and struggles over rent payment.33 Although limited to certain areas,
the agrarian unrest showed the pressure of a growing rural population, and
the then-existing pattern of land distribution severely curtailed the
population’s ability to meet its needs.34

http://colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence#one (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
21 See RABASA ET AL., COLOMBIAN LABYRINTH, supra note 1.
22 CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6.
23 CODHES, CODHES INFORMA, BOLETÍN DE LA CONSULTORÍA PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y
EL DESPLAZAMIENTO [CODHES INFORMS, BULLETIN FROM THE CONSULTANCY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DISPLACEMENT] [hereinafter CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011] 1-2 (2011), available at http://ccaicolombia.org/files/primarydocs/110919codh.pdf [hereinafter CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011].
24 See id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17; CENTER FOR JUSTICE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6.
25 CÉSAR TORRES DEL RÍO, COLOMBIA SIGLO XX: DESDE LA GUERRA DE LOS MIL DÍAS HASTA
LA ELECCIÓN DE ÁLVARO URIBE [COLOMBIA 20TH CENTURY] 45 (2010).
26 Id. at 91; BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 181.
27 Leech, supra note 20.
28 See BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 161-63.
29 Id. at 157; see also id. at 181-83.
30 Id. at 186.
31 TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 118.
32 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 186.
33 Id.
34 See id.
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The assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 caused a wave of
violence in Bogotá.35 The Liberal leader was an avid supporter of agrarian
and labor reforms.36 His murder led to a major uprising of the lower classes
in Bogotá known as the Bogotazo.37 Violent outbreaks also occurred in
other large cities and small liberal towns.38
Peasant insurgency against the government continued when Laureano
Gómez assumed the presidency in 1950.39 Approximately 4,000 armed
peasants resisted the government politics and the attacks of the armed bands
of Conservatives.40 The armed peasants formed the first nucleus of liberal
guerrillas.41 The violence resulted in the forced displacement of civilians,
including those who inhabited liberal towns in Boyacá, Santander, and
North of Santander.42
Gómez’s regime ended in 1953 when General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla
seized power through a coup d’etat.43 Rojas Pinilla was highly supported,
as he was in the position to bring La Violencia44 to an end.45 His initial
efforts included reclaiming the property of landowners who were forced to
flee and abandon their lands.46 In response, the armed peasants demanded
an agrarian reform.47 In 1953, Rojas Pinilla created the Office for
Rehabilitation and Relief to respond to peasant demands, and he issued an
amnesty to the armed peasants in an effort to end La Violencia.48 The

35

Id.
See TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 123.
37 Id. at 192. The incidents following Gaitán’s death were more of a Colombianazo than a
Bogotazo, because the outbreaks and riots occurred throughout the country. Id.; see also BUSHNELL,
supra note 3, at 202 (“The . . . term [el nueve de abril] is preferable, because
Bogotazo focuses attention strictly on disturbances in the national capital, whereas in actuality what
happened was a nationwide outburst, with scenes of violence repeated not only in other large cities but
also in many small towns of heavy Liberal majority.”).
38 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 202.
39 TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 198.
40 Id.
41 Id.; see also LIBRO NEGRO DE LA REPRESION: FRENTE NACIONAL 1958-1974 [THE BLACK
BOOK OF THE REPRESSION: NATIONAL FRONT] 5 (1st ed. 1974) [hereinafter THE BLACK BOOK OF THE
REPRESSION].
42 TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 198.
43 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 215; see also TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 221.
44 La Violencia was a period in which the country experienced outbursts of violence between
1946 and 1957. BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 201. Between 100,000 and 200,000 individuals were
murdered during this period. See, e.g., Mario Chacon et al., When is Democracy an Equilibrium?
Theory and Evidence from Colombia’s “La Violencia”, 55 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 369 (2011).
45 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 215.
46 Leech, supra note 20.
47 Id.
48 Id.
36
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Office did not fulfill the purpose of alleviating the agrarian problem.49 But
despite not achieving its intended purpose, Rojas Pinilla’s actions had
negative consequences on his popularity and support. They raised
suspicion amongst Liberals and Conservatives, who deemed the President’s
ineffective reform as an attempt to gain popular support.50 Ultimately,
Rojas Pinilla’s efforts to end La Violencia were unsuccessful.51
The political battle between Liberal and Conservative leaders over
power ended in 1957 with the creation of the National Front.52 The
National Front was an alliance between Liberals and Conservatives,53 in
which both parties agreed to alternate between them the control over the
executive branch for four terms, or sixteen years.54 The agreement
ameliorated the political unrest,55 but the country faced the main
consequence of the long conflict between the elite and the peasants: the new
phenomenon of leftist guerrilla insurgency.56
B. Rise of the Guerrillas
Guerrilla groups that originated in the mid-century violent era settled
in areas of public land.57 In the 1950s and 1960s, the first wave of land
colonization took place.58 Peasants joined guerrilla groups after guerrilla
concealment of land parcels forced peasants out of their lands.59 Some
groups settled in inhospitable places deemed public land in Magdalena,
Cauca, and the eastern plains.60 Tolima was also the subject of armed
colonization by the guerrilla group which later became the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).61 Their colonization
expanded, taking control over vast portions of land.62
The guerrillas became infamous for committing dreadful atrocities as a
strategy to gain control.63 In October 1998, for example, the Ejército de

49

See id.
Id.
51 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 222.
52 See id. at 223; see also THE BLACK BOOK OF THE REPRESSION, supra note 41.
53 THE BLACK BOOK OF THE REPRESSION, supra note 41, at 7.
54 Id.
55 BUSHNELL, supra note 3, at 223.
56 Id.
57 CHARLES W. BERGQUIST, VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA: THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 198 (1992).
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 199.
62 Id.
63 Alexandra De La Asuncion, comment, Colombia: The Ignored Humanitarian Crisis, 31 U.
50
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Liberación Nacional (“ELN”) bombed a pipeline at night.64 The oil and
gases from the bombing extended to a nearby community, igniting sixtyfour houses and killing seventy-three sleeping innocents.65 The purpose
behind the bombing of the pipeline was to collect money through extortion,
and to express its opposition to the country’s dealings with multinational
companies.66 In December of the same year, the FARC attacked a
community it suspected was in support of paramilitaries.67 The FARC
killed women and children, while torturing, decapitating, and castrating
men.68 The murders, kidnappings, and other abuses by the guerrillas have
forced the internal displacement of affected victims.69
C. Rise of the Paramilitaries
Landowners created paramilitary counterinsurgent groups in the
1980s.70 These groups originated with the purpose of resisting the
guerrillas.71 They launched offensives against the guerrillas and anyone in
support of the guerrillas.72
The paramilitaries were declared illegal in 1989.73 Despite their
illegality, the Colombian Army has supported paramilitary groups with
training and logistical support.74 The Army has tolerated the gruesome acts
by paramilitaries, and it has failed to protect innocent civilians.75 It also
has, in conjunction with paramilitaries, launched several offensives against
guerrillas, resulting in the brutal murder of innocent civilians.76
The paramilitaries have been the perpetrators of egregious human

MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 439, 448 (2000).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999: COLOMBIA (1999), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,,COL,,3ae6a8bf8,0.html [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999].
67 De La Asuncion, supra note 63, at 448.
68 Id.
69 CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011, supra note 23, at 1-2.
70 CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6.
71 Id.
72 De La Asuncion, supra note 63, at 450.
73 Id.
74 See id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 66.
75 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 66.
76 See id.; Latino Daily News, Retired Colombian General Sentenced for Killing Peasant Leader
in
1997,
HISPANICALLY
SPEAKING
NEWS,
Aug.
25,
2012,
http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/notitas-de-noticias/details/retired-colombian-generalsentenced-for-killing-peasant-leader-in-1997/18080/ [hereinafter Retired Colombian General
Sentenced].
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rights abuses.77 They have tortured, murdered, and displaced combatants,
peasants, indigenous people, Afro-Colombians, religious leaders, and trade
unionists among others.78 Numerous massacres have been charged to
them.79 In July 1997, for example, a group of paramilitaries killed thirty
people during a five-day massacre.80 Some of their victims were cut to
death with machetes, while others were decapitated with chainsaws.81 The
bodies, some still alive, were dumped into a nearby river.82 Confidential
paramilitary sources later revealed that the Colombian Army had been
involved in the planning of the massacre.83
Another example of human rights abuses perpetrated by paramilitaries
in conjunction with the Colombian Army is the 1997 attack in the region of
Urabá.84 The Afro-Colombian leader Marino Lopez Mena was brutally
murdered during the attack.85 After decapitating Lopez Mena, the
paramilitaries played soccer with his head.86 As a result of these human
rights violations, innocent civilians have been forcibly displaced.
D. The Conflict in the Twenty-First Century
The election of Álvaro Uribe Vélez brought significant changes to the
conflict.87 His administration was proactive in efforts to end the violence,
achieving great success.88 But despite all efforts and positive outcomes of
Uribe Vélez’s administration, the violence in Colombia persists.89

77

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 66.
CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6.
79
A massacre is the slaying of four or more people within the same locality at the same time.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 66.
80 The
Massacre in Maripipan, COLOMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK (1997),
http://colhrnet.igc.org/newsletter/y1997/winter97art/mapiri.htm; see also Jo-Marie Burt, The Massacre
at Maripipan, COLOMBIA JOURNAL (Apr. 3, 2000), http://colombiajournal.org/colombia6.htm; Michael
Evans, Declassified Documents: 1997 Maripipán Massacre: Coordinated in Advance with Colombian
Army, GLOBAL RESEARCH (July 19, 2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/declassified-documents-1997mapirip-n-massacre-coordinated-in-advance-with-colombian-army/31962.
81
Burt, supra note 80.
82
Id.
83
Evans, supra note 80.
84
Retired Colombian General Sentenced, supra note 76; Susana Pimiento, Winds of Peace in
Colombia and the Fate of Paramilitary Structures, FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://forusa.org/blogs/susana-pimiento/winds-peace-colombia-fate-paramilitary-structures/10985.
85
Id.
86
Pimiento, supra note 84.
87
See CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17; Lt. Oliver North, The Other War on Terror, MILITARY.COM (Jan.
13, 2005), http://www.military.com/Opinions/0,,FreedomAlliance_011305,00.html.
88
Id.
89
See CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6; CODHES, CODHES INFORMS
2011, supra note 23, at 2; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17.
78
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III. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
The internal conflict has been the principal cause of forced
displacement from its beginning.90 Fifty years into the conflict, peasants
remain the most affected individuals.91 Millions of peasants have been
forcibly displaced.92 The activities and abuses by the guerrillas, the
paramilitaries, and the Colombian Army have forced peasants to leave their
homes behind in search for the safety of the cities.93

90

See TORRES DEL RÍO, supra note 25, at 198.
See CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011, supra note 23, at 1; Marc Hanson, Refugees
International, Colombia: Transformational Change Must Include Urban IDPS, REFUGEES
INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 12, 2012), http://refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/Colombiatransformational-change-must-include-urban-idps.
92 See HANSON, supra note 91.
93 CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2011, supra note 23, at 1-2.
91
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94

The map illustrates the principal areas of expulsion of displaced
individuals. It also shows the municipalities that housed seventy-three
percent of the displaced population between 2004 and 2006. The red area
(“Municipios que combinan mayor cantidad de población desplazada y
mayor intensidad de desplazamiento”) highlights the municipalities with the
most displaced individuals and areas with the highest rates of displacement.

94
Proyecto Terranova: Análisis Sobre el Desplazamiento y Tierras [Terranova Project: An
Analysis
of
Displacement
and
Lands],
UNIVERSIDAD
DE
LOS
ANDES,
http://terranova.uniandes.edu.co/sobreterranova.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
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The green area (“Municipios que registran solamente mayor cantidad de
población desplazada”) highlights municipalities that report only high
numbers of displaced individuals. Last, the blue area (“Municipios que
registran solamente mayor intensidad de desplazamiento”) highlights
municipalities that report only high rates of displacement.
In 2011 alone, an estimated 259,146 individuals were displaced,
escaping intimidation and violence.95 Of these, about 29,521 individuals
were forced out of their towns in crowds in seventy-three different instances
of massive displacement.96 Between 1985 and 2011, approximately 5.5
million people had been displaced.97 Over ninety percent of these
individuals found refuge in urban areas.98
Internally displaced persons are three times more likely to live in
poverty and five times more likely to live in extreme poverty than the
average Colombian.99 Accustomed to a rural life, they struggle to make a
living in urban areas.100 Their income is thirty percent less than the income
of non-displaced individuals living within the same area.101 As a
consequence of displacement, inter-generational poverty results, because
displacement forces children to delay or suspend their education.102
Internally displaced persons usually live in urban areas of high-risk.103
These areas, which are overcrowded with houses and susceptible to natural
disasters such as floods, have restricted access to public services.104 The
levels of violence are extremely high.105 Women and young girls are often
exposed to sexual abuses, while young men are forced to join illegally
armed groups with presence or dominion over marginalized
neighborhoods.106
IV. THE LAW OF VICTIMS AND LAND RESTITUTION
In response to the situation of millions of internally displaced
individuals, the government enacted the Law of Victims and Land
95 CODHES,
CODHES INFORMA [CODHES INFORMS]
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.acnur.org/t3/uploads/media/CODHES_Informa_79_Desplazamiento_creciente_y_crisis_hu
manitaria_invisibilizada_Marzo_2012.pdf?view=1 [hereinafter CODHES, CODHES INFORMS 2012].
96 Id. at 5.
97 Id. at 35; HANSON, supra note 91.
98 HANSON, supra note 91.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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Restitution in June 10, 2011.107 The Law of Victims intends to achieve
reconciliation between the conflict victims and the National Government,
and reestablish the victims’s lost confidence in the government.108 It seeks
to reinstate the conflict victims to their condition prior to facing the
violations listed under the Law.109 Also, it provides a framework that
recognizes the rights of the conflict victims, and gives them priority over
the benefits the government affords.110 The framework establishes a set of
judicial, administrative, economic, and social standards to achieve its
ends.111
A. Who is a Victim under the Law
The Law of Victims defines as victims those individuals who suffered
human rights violations in connection with the armed conflict.112 Human
rights violations under the Law include: murder; displacement;
disappearance; dispossession of lands; kidnapping; false positives, and
other attacks against civilians; sexual abuses, and other crimes against
sexual integrity; and victims of landmines, and any other illegal war
strategy.113 The perpetrators of the violations must be the guerrillas,
paramilitaries, or the Colombian Army.114 The Law of Victims limits its
protection to victims harmed after January 1, 1985.115
The definition of victim includes spouses and permanent partners,
including same-sex partners.116 It also includes family members of harmed
individuals that are in first degree of consanguinity, or first degree of
affinity, when the direct victim was assassinated or went missing.117 If no
relative of first degree is identified, relatives of ascending second degree
will be considered victims.118 The definition of victims also covers any
individual harmed during efforts to prevent victimization or in assisting an
actual victim in danger.119

107 See Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras [Law of Victims and Land Restitution], L.
1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], Prólogo 3 (Colom.),
available at http://www.colombiaenaccion.gov.co/victimas?cat=37.
108 Id.; HANSON, supra note 91.
109 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 71.
110 Id. art. 3.
111 See id.
112 Id.
113 ABC of the Law of Victims and Land Restitution, supra note 11.
114 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 3.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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Members of the armed groups are not considered victims, unless the
member renounced any association to the group while he was a minor.120
Spouses, partners, or relatives of members of armed groups are considered
victims, but not indirect victims of the violent acts committed by these
groups.121 Victims of ordinary crimes are not considered victims for the
purposes of the Law.122
B. Measures for Relief
The Law of Victims offers the following measures for relief,
respectively.
1. Land Restitution
The first form of relief the Law of Victims provides is the restitution of
Under the Law, the government will reinstate property title or
land.
possession to the victims.124 It will make efforts to obtain the land the
victims were displaced of.125 In case the restitution of land is not feasible,
due to impossibility in obtaining the land, or because the victim’s return
will endanger her life or personal integrity, alternative equivalent measures
are offered to the victim.126 These measures include a grant of land in a
different location with characteristics that are similar to those of the
property lost.127 The victim will receive monetary compensation for her
land, only if all of the foregoing measures are unfeasible.128 Monetary
compensation will not exceed the land value appraised during the restitution
process.129
The Law of Victims is not limited to the return of parcels of land; it
also provides for restitution of homestead.130 Victims, whose homes have
been damaged by abandonment, dispossession, or any type of loss, have
priority over home subsidies for the construction of, improvements to, and
the acquisition of new homes.131 Those who return to their original
123

120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. art. 3, ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. art. 3, ¶ 3.
Id. art. 72.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 98.
Id. art. 123.
Id.
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properties will have priority in receiving home subsidies.132
2. Indemnification
The Law of Victims indemnifies victims depending on the severity of
the victimizing act and the number of household members.133 After
considering these factors, the government determines the amount the victim
is entitled to.134 Victims receive their indemnification through any of the
following: (1) integral land subsidies; (2) home replacement; (3) land
acquisition and adjudication; (4) lot adjudication and entitlement for
displaced individuals; (5) home subsidies for improvements, repairs, or
construction; or (6) home subsidies for acquisition, improvement, or
construction of new homes.135 Any monies the victims received as
administrative indemnification prior to the enactment of the Law of Victims
will be deducted from the total amount that the Law of Victims entitles
them to.136
3. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation consists of different legal, medical, psychological, and
social programs, aimed at the recovery of victims, who suffered
psychological or physical harm.137 The programs will provide for
psychological and medical treatment to the victims.138 The length of
psycho-social support will vary, based on the needs of the victim.139
C. Education
The Law of Victims requires academic institutions to take all
necessary measures to ensure access and exemption of all educational costs
to the victims.140 The Law of Victims includes only basic education.141
Victims who can afford costs of education are not entitled to receive these
132

Id.
Id. art. 132.
134 Id.
135 Id. art. 132, ¶ 3.
136 Id. art 132, ¶ 4; DEPARTAMENTO PARA LA PROSPERIDAD SOCIAL, RESUMEN GENERAL DE LA
LEY
[GENERAL
SUMMARY
OF
THE
LAW]
5-6
(2011),
available
at
http://es.scribd.com/doc/75893565/Resumen-General-de-La-Ley.
137 Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 135; see also
Germán Gómez Polo, Ley de Victimas Está Paralizada en Bolívar [The Law of Victims is Paralyzed in
Bolivar], EL UNIVERSAL (July 29, 2012), http://www.eluniversal.com.co/cartagena/bolivar/ley-devictimas-esta-paralizada-en-bolivar-85731?iframe=true&width=90%&height=90%.
138 Id. arts. 137-38.
139 Id. art. 136.
140 Id. art. 51.
141 Id.
133
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benefits.142 The Law of Victims mandates that post-secondary institutions
establish selection, admission, and matriculation processes to facilitate the
victims’s accessibility to their programs.143 Priority is given to female
heads of families, incapacitated individuals, and adolescents.144
D. Measures for Protection of the Victims
Pursuant to the Law of Victims, law enforcement agencies must adopt
necessary measures to protect the victims, witnesses, and government
officials involved in judicial and administrative processes for reparation and
land restitution.145 The Law of Victims recognizes that these individuals
are susceptible to risks of danger.146 As such, it requires law enforcement
officials to establish preventive measures to mitigate the risk of danger.147
V. CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW
The Law of Victims benefits six million campesinos, or peasant farm
workers, who have fallen victim to the internal conflict and have faced
internal displacement.148 The Law is a groundbreaker because it offers a
great deal of unprecedented benefits. It is significantly descriptive in
creating quasi-judicial and other administrative agencies to effectuate its
objectives. Nonetheless, the Law is problematic, for it is too ambitious and
faces substantial implementation challenges. The Law is ideal for a postconflict environment, yet Colombia’s internal conflict is far from over.
Despite successful efforts in demobilizing thousands of members of armed
groups,149 and in diminishing cocaine production,150 violence persists in the
country. The ongoing violence, together with sequels of the conflict, is the
main impediment to the implementation of the law.
The challenges and difficulties the Law of Victims faces can make it
an ineffective method to restore the victims.151 Among the rights it sets

142

Id.
See id.
144 Id.
145 Id. art. 31.
146 Id.
147 Id. art. 31, ¶ 2.
148 Santi Quiñones, ‘Blanqueo de Tierras’ en Colombia [‘Bleaching of Lands’ in Colombia],
PERIODISMO HUMANO (Spain), Nov. 11, 2012, http://periodismohumano.com/en-conflicto/blanqueo-detierras-en-colombia-la-guerra-como-coartada-para-arrebatar-a-los-campesinos-10-millones-dehectareas.html.
149 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17.
150 North, supra note 87.
151 Maria Cano Roldán & Octavio Augusto Caro Garzón, Las Grandes Dificultades de la
Reparación Administrativa de las Víctimas de la Violencia en Colombia: Algunos Comentarios
Respecto a la Implementación del Decreto 1290 de 2008 [The Great Difficulties of the Administrative
143
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forth, the Law of Victims promises the “integral reparation” of the
victims.152 And, as part of the integral reparation, it includes the right to
land restitution, which seeks to place the victims in their position prior to
falling victim to the conflict.153 It also establishes the “warranty of no
repetition,”154 which guarantees to the victims that they will not be subjects
of second instances of the same crime.155 The challenges the Law faces
make these rights of an enuciative efficacy nature because they impede the
law from achieving its objectives.156 These challenges include the social
inequality and lack of effective measures to guarantee the socioeconomic
stabilization of the victims,157 the ongoing internal conflict,158 and the
current landmine situation in Colombia.159

Reparation of the Victims of the Violence in Colombia: Some Comments with Respect to the
Implementation of the Decree 1290 of 2008], 41 REVISTA FACULTAD DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS
POLÍTICAS
451,
479
(2011)
(Colom.),
available
at
http://revistas.upb.edu.co/index.php/derecho/article/view/1072/969.
152
Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 25; see also
ABC of the Law of Victims and Land Restitution, supra note 11.
153
Id.
154
Law of Victims, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], arts. 1, 25.
155
See id.
156
See Cano Roldán et al., supra note 151, at 476. The effectiveness of a law can be measured
through the standards for instrumental efficacy or symbolic efficacy. Id. A law achieves instrumental
efficacy when the legal aspect of the law is linked to its social aspect. Id. Furthermore, the law must
have clear and definite goals, which can be achieved so long as the framework created to achieve them
is carried out. Id.
In contrast, a law acquires mere symbolic efficacy when no connection exists between the specific goals
of the law, the law’s framework to achieve those goals, and the actual results. Id. at 477. In this case,
the law becomes nothing more than a legal order seeking to achieve its goals through an idea. Id.
Symbolic efficacy also takes place when a law dictates only a social obligation. Id. It calls for “doing
something” that “will serve to create a representation in the public opinion,” rather than imposing a
specific conduct or procedure. Id.
There are two types of symbolic efficacy: enunciative efficacy and argumentative efficacy. Id.
Enunciative efficacy takes its form in laws which goals are not achieved due to lack of performance or
application. Id. The instrumental object of the law is never achieved; thus, it only accomplishes a
symbolic objective. Id. A law is of an argumentative efficacy nature when no link is formed between
its specific goals and the results. Id. The law is successful in achieving other goals that are different
from those it directed. Id. Thus, the law is deemed effective but not efficacious. Id. Argumentative
efficacy also occurs when the individuals applying the law (i.e., the judiciary and administrative
authorities) are not in accord with the agency creating the law (i.e., Congress). Id. In this case, the law
serves a political use, where its objectives are not carried out. Id.
157
Aura Patricia Bolivar Jaime, Internally Displaced Population, Debts and Restitution,
DEJUSTICIA
(Colom.)
Aug.
17,
2012,
available
at
http://dejusticia.org/index.php?modo=interna&tema=justicia_transicional&publicacion=1264&lang=en
[hereinafter Bolivar, Internally displaced population].
158
See Nicole Summers, Colombia’s Victims’ Law: Transitional Justice in a Time of Violent
Conflict?, 25 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 219, 220 (2012).
159
See 70% de Tierras Despojadas por la Guerrilla Pueden Tener Minas [70% of Lands
Abandoned by the Guerrillas may be Infected with Landmines], EL TIEMPO (Colom.), (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/tolima/70-de-tierras-despojadas-por-la-guerrilla-pueden-tener-
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A. Social Inequality and Lack of Effective Measures for Economic
Stabilization
The environment of socioeconomic inequality, in which the internal
conflict originated, persists in Colombia. The high concentration of land
ownership was one of the leading causes of the internal conflict.160 To date,
Colombia has an unequal pattern of land ownership.161 This distribution of
lands has created an agrarian structure of two contrasting forms, where a
small number of individuals hold ownership of the vast majority of
productive land.162 Such distribution has resulted in inequalities that are
economic, social, and political in nature.163 It has also restrained rural
development.164
The main challenge to the socioeconomic stabilization of the returning
victims is the high concentration of land ownership, because the Law does
nothing to change the unequal pattern of land tenure.165 Restitution of lands
differs from a land reform with regard to land tenure.166 A land reform
changes the pattern of land tenure.167 Restitution returns previously owned
lands, whether the plots are large or small. On the contrary, a land reform,
appropriates large tracts of land, or latifundios, which are owned by few,
and redistributes them amongst a higher number of individuals in small to
medium plots.168
This redistribution has the tendency of curing
socioeconomic inequalities in rural areas.169
The inability of small plot farmers to benefit from their lands is
associated with the unequal distribution of land tenure.170 Agricultural
policy generally harms the productivity of small plot farms, even though
small plot farms are more productive than large farms per hectare.171 Small
plot farmers are at a disadvantage because they lack machinery, education,
and political connections, and current government policies favor large

minas_12280172-4.
160
Rodriguez, supra note 14.
161
Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 44.
162
Rodriguez, supra note 14.
163
Id.
164
Id.; see also Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 4.
165
Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 4, 11; see also Rodriguez, supra note 14.
166
See Nelson Camilo Sánchez, Reforma Agraria y Restitución [Land Reform and Restitution],
DEJUSTICIA
(Colom.),
Sept.
16,
2012,
available
at
http://www.dejusticia.org/index.php?modo=interna&tema=justicia_transicional&publicacion=840.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169 See id.; David Wilson & Roy Laishley, Land Reform—Success and Failure, NEW
INTERNATIONALIST (Nov. 1, 1979), available at http://newint.org/features/1979/11/01/land-reform/.
170
Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 11.
171
Id.
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farms.172 Further, large farmers are in a better position to adjust their prices
and to respond to income inequalities.173 Absent social support, small plot
farmers have limited access to farm equipment, new agricultural techniques,
and markets.174
The lack of means affects land productivity and, consequently, the
victims’s socioeconomic advancement.175 Handing lands to inexperienced
farm workers is fatal to agricultural production.176 The victims need
knowledge or experience in agriculture or animal husbandry to make their
lands productive.177 Title IV of the Decree 4800 attempts to resolve this
issue through the creation of programs for education, training, and
professional development.178 However, these programs lack effective
coordination.179 In addition, in order to function on a sound basis from the
outset, the victims will also need access to subsidies, equipment, and
markets, among other things.180 The socioeconomic advancement of the
victims is at stake unless the government provides the victims with
adequate means to take advantage of their lands.181 Also, stagnant or
Rural
decreasing land productivity restrains rural development.182
development is another outcome expected from the implementation of the
Law of Victims.183
Other factors are also contributing to the obstruction of the victims’s
ability to take advantage of their lands.184
For example, forced
displacement brought along the abandonment of the lands.185 From

172

Id.
See Wilson et al., supra note 169.
174
Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 11.
175
See id.; Wilson et al., supra note 169.
176
See Wilson et al., supra note 169.
177
See, e.g., id.
178
Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 48; see also L. 4800/11, diciembre 20, 2011, DIARIO
OFICIAL
[D.O.]
(Colom.),
available
at
http://www.leydevictimas.gov.co/documents/10179/19132/completo.pdf.
179
Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 48.
180
See Wilson et al., supra note 169.
181
See id.; see also Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 4, 11.
182
See Wilson et al., supra note 169.
183
Rodrigo Uprimmy-Yepes & Nelson Camilo Sánchez, Los Dilemas de la Restitución de
Tierras en Colombia [The Dilemmas of the Restitution of Lands in Colombia], 12 ESTUD. SOCIO-JURID.
305, 308 (2010) (Colom.), available at http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?pid=S012405792010000200010&script=sci_arttext.
184
See Juan Carlos Díaz, Ley de Tierras Vistas por los Campesinos de los Montes de María
[Law of Victims as Seen by Peasants in Montes de Maria], EL TIEMPO (Colom.), Apr. 9, 2012, available
at
http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cartagena/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR11524641.html.
185
Id.; see also Aura Patricia Bolivar Jaime, Land Restitution: Is it a Trap?, DEJUSTICIA
(Colom.)
(Nov.
22,
2012),
available
at
173
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approximately ten million hectares of displaced land, about four million
hectares remained abandoned and unattended in 2012.186 The abandonment
of the lands has made them unsuitable for livelihood and for production.187
This situation hinders the ability of the victims to work their land and earn
an income.188 The lands must be “civilized” before they can become
productive.189 However, the cost of “civilizing” one hectare of land is at
least three million pesos or $1,679 dollars, a cost that most victims living in
poverty cannot afford.190
In certain cases where victims sold their lands to escape violence,
succeeding owners reforested the lands and planted non-native species.191
This has had a grave environmental impact on the lands.192 In Montes de
María, for instance, the non-native eucalyptus has invaded the lands.193 The
invasion of these trees has caused native animals to migrate in search for
food.194 These species, which include iguanas, wolves, and squirrels,
depend on native plants for their survival.195 The environmental impact
results in loss of productivity of the land and, consequently, inhibits the
victims’s ability to depend on their land for livelihood, and to work it for
income.196
As a result of the foregoing issues, the Law of Victims, along with the
supplementing framework for rural development that the Decree 4800
attempts to establish, could achieve only symbolic efficacy.197 The Law is
in danger of becoming a total failure unless the government implements an
effective framework to ensure a source of income for the victims upon their
return.198 If governmental efforts fail, the victims will be victimized again,
and the government’s obligation to restitute the victims and guarantee their
enjoyment of rights would increase.199

http://dejusticia.org/index.php?modo=interna&tema=justicia_transicional&publicacion=1380
(hereinafter Bolivar, Land Restitution: Is it a Trap?).
186
Quiñones, supra note 148.
187
Díaz, supra note 184.
188
See id.; Bolivar, Land Restitution: Is it a Trap?, supra note 185.
189
Díaz, supra note 184.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
See id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
See id.
197
Bolivar, Internally Displaced Population, supra note 157.
198
Id.
199
Id.
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B. The Ongoing Internal Conflict
As part of its objectives to achieve the victims’s “integral reparation,”
the Law of Victims provides a warranty of no repetition.200 The Law
promises that the victims will not face the same abuses again, including
forced displacement.201 The Law establishes measures to protect the
victims and prevent their re-victimization.202 However, the internal conflict
in Colombia is far from over.203 The conflict poses the most difficult
challenge to the implementation of the Law of Victims and its warranty of
no repetition.204 So long as the violence persists, the warranty of no
repetition will become a complete failure, achieving only symbolic
efficacy.205
The presence of armed groups in areas intended for restitution prevents
the restitution of lands and the fulfillment of the warranty of no
repetition.206 Existing and newly armed groups continue to displace peasant
farm workers,207 making it extremely difficult for the government to
guarantee that the victims will not be subjected to displacement again.208
Although former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez engaged in successful
efforts to demobilize the armed groups,209 successor groups continue to
commit atrocious crimes, forcing the displacement of civilians.210 In Maria
La Baja, for example, paramilitary successor groups broke into six homes
between April 2011 and January 2012.211 The armed men held the victims
in captivity and stole property from their homes.212 They also forced
200

L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 1, 25 (Colum.).
See id.
202
See id. arts. 31-34, 149-50; Summers, supra note 158, at 233.
203
HAUGAARD, ET AL., supra note 15, at 1; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLOMBIA:
VICTIMS
LAW
A
HISTORIC
OPPORTUNITY
(June
10,
2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/10/colombia-victims-law-historic-opportunity [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, VICTIMS LAW A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY]; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION
MONITOR,
COLOMBIA:
MINE
BAN
POLICY,
http://www.themonitor.org/custom/index.php/region_profiles/print_profile/450 (last updated Dec. 17, 2012).
204
Summers, supra note 158, at 219; see also Politica, Piden a Santos Acciones Concretas
Contra Ejércitos Anti-Restitución [Santos Is Called for Concrete Measures Against Anti-Restitution
Armies], EL ESPECTADOR (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo389813-piden-santos-acciones-concretas-contra-ejercitos-anti-restitucio.
205
See Summers, supra note 158, at 233.
206
Rodriguez, supra note 14; see also Daniel Valero, Víctimas Reclaman 700,000 Hectáreas
Robadas por las Farc [Victims Reclaim 700,000 Hectares Stolen by the Farc], EL TIEMPO (Sept. 30,
2012), http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-12269101.html.
207
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.
208
Rodriguez, supra note 14.
209
CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 6.
210
Id.; HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11; Summers, supra note 158, at 233.
211
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.
212
Id.
201
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women to wash their clothes and serve them before raping eleven of
them.213 The victimized families fled their homes after the abuses and
invasions.214 Additionally, the guerrillas have also been the perpetrators of
abuses against peasant farm workers.215 The guerrillas have been involved
in extortion; killings; forced recruitment of civilians, including children;
confinement of communities; and forced displacement.216
The enactment of the Law of Victims brought along a new wave of
illegally armed groups, whose purpose is to resist its implementation.217
These groups are known as the Ejércitos Anti-Restitución, or “AntiRestitution Armies.”218 Large landowners are the main financers of these
insurgent groups.219 Landowners who fund these groups are often subject
to investigations for illegal acquirement of land title.220 These landowners
are attempting to keep their illegally acquired lands by impeding the return
of lands to the rightful owners.221
Lumber, mining, and cement companies, among others, are also
involved in Anti-Restitution Armies.222 The companies and landowners
employ legal and illegal tactics to appropriate the campesinos’s lands.223
These include: the appropriation of lands that campesinos lack title to; the
prevention of the campesinos’s access to life-sustaining resources, such as
water and markets; pressuring the campesinos into selling their lands; and
employing former illegal groups to threaten the campesinos and to commit
213

See id.
Id.
215
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012,
supra note 17.
216
Id.
217
Carta del MOVICE al Presidente Juan Manuel Santos Previa Movilización 6 de Marzo
[MOVICE’s March 6th Letter to President Juan Manuel Santos], MOVICE (July 16, 2012),
http://www.movimientodevictimas.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1207:cartadel-movice-al-presidente-juan-manuel-santos-previa-movilizacion-del-6-de-marzo&catid=50:6-de-m;
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11; see also ONG Denunció Amenzas de “Ejército Anti-Restitución
de Tierras” [NGO Denounces Threats from “Anti Land Restitution Army”], LA F.M. (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.lafm.com.co/noticias/colombia/23-02-12/ong-denuncio-amenazas-de-ejerc-10; Santos Is
Called for Concrete Measures Against Anti-Restitution Armies, supra note 204.
218
Id.
219
MOVICE’s March 6 Letter to President Juan Manuel Santos, supra note 217.
220
See Camilo Segura Álvarez, Los “Líderes” del Ejército Anti-Restitución [“Leaders” of the
Anti-Restitution
Army],
AGENCIA
PRENSA
RURAL
(July
13,
2012),
http://prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article8610; Politico, ¿Un Ejército Anti-Restitución? [An AntiRestitution
Army?],
EL
ESPECTADOR
(July
5,
2012),
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/articulo-357427-un-ejercito-anti-restitucion.
221
Ejército Anti-Restitución Amenaza a Sucre [Anti-Restitution Army Threatens Sucre], EL
HERALDO (June 24, 2012), http://www.elheraldo.co/noticias/nacional/ejercito-anti-restitucion-amenazasucre-72367.
222
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.
223
Id.
214
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abuses against them.224
In Montes de María, where the United States and Colombian
governments have declared that security is restored, large companies have
been seizing the campesinos’s land and forcing their displacement since
2008.225 These companies are employing paramilitary successor groups as
security guards and enforcers.226 Campesinos who bring up the issue to the
companies’s agents or authorized personnel are subject to death threats.227
For instance, a campesino leader from Montes de María revealed that he
began receiving death threats after complaining with the manager of a
lumber company about the company’s activities.228 The company was
cutting off the campesinos’s access to the road that leads to the market
where the campesinos sell their produce.229 “More threats are coming from
the lumber company directly than from the illegal groups, though the two
are linked,” he explained.230
Threats against the victims are a growing concern as well as an
interference with the implementation of the Law.231 The government is not
providing the victims with adequate protection,232 as promised by the
Law.233 And without the necessary protection, “even the very institutions
intended to return land to victims . . . [could] become generators of new
dangers and new displacements.”234 In the municipality of Montería, some
victims have received threats after filing a claim for land restitution.235
Perpetrators approached victims immediately after filing their claims,
threatening them, and demanding they desist from proceeding with the

224

Id.
Id.
226
See id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
See id.
230
Id.
231
Argemiro Piñeros Moreno, Ley de Víctimas, un Año Después [Law of Victims, a Year Later],
EL UNIVERSAL (June 11, 2012), http://www.eluniversal.com.co/cartagena/politica/ley-de-victimas-unano-despues-79691; HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2-3; “La Ley de Restitución de Tierras se
Debe Cumplir a Pesar de sus Enemigos”: Minagricultura [“The Land Restitution Law Should Be
Enforced
Despite
Its
Enemies”],
EL
UNIVERSAL
(Jan.
9,
2012),
http://www.eluniversal.com.co/monteria-y-sincelejo/economica/%E2%80%9Cla-ley-de-restitucion-detierras-se-debe-cumplir-pesar-de-sus-enemig; see also Gobierno, Ofrecen Recompenzas ante Amenazas
Contra Reclamantes de Tierras [Rewards Offered as a Result of Threats Against Land Claimants],
SEMANA (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ofrecen-recompensa-ante-amenazascontra-reclamantes-tierras/265582-3.
232
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
233
See L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 31-32 (Colom.).
234
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2-3.
235
Gobierno, Rewards Offered as a Result of Threats Against Land Claimants, supra note 231.
225
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claims.236 They pressured the victims into signing documents and offered
them about $1,200 to dismiss the claims.237 If the victims declined, the
perpetrators threatened the victims, telling them that their refusal would
result in “serious consequences.”238
Illegally armed groups, and those who oppose land restitution, have
also made threats to members of non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) and leaders of land claimants, with the purpose of interfering
with the implementation of the Law of Victims.239 Between 2010 and 2012,
members of illegally armed groups have killed over twenty-five leaders
who campaigned for the return of displaced victims to their lands.240 Jairo
Mejia Martinez, a former member of the FARC and a land restitution
leader, was brutally murdered in his backyard in June 2012.241 The death
threats against leaders increased after this attack.242 On October 2, 2012,
members of the Anti-Restitution Army sent an email to several NGOs that
read: “[d]eath to all members of associations, like the snitches who work in
the restitution of lands.”243 The same day, they sent yet another death threat
via text message to land restitution leaders in Bolivar.244
Colombia’s internal conflict is far from over.245 The existing insurgent
groups, and the emergence of the new Anti-Restitution armies, impede the
success of the warranty of no repetition, as well as the implementation of

236

Id.
See id.
238
Id.
239
Amnesty International, Amenazas de Muerte Contra Defensores Reclamantes de Restitución
de Tierras [Death Threats Against Advocates Claiming Land Restitution], COLECTIVO DE ABOGADOS
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.colectivodeabogados.org/Amenaza-de-muerte-contra; Denuncian 15
Amenazas en el Último Mes Contra Líderes de Restitución de Tierras [Fifteen Threats Denounced
Against Leaders of Land Restitution in the Last Month], ADN (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://diarioadn.co/actualidad/colombia/denuncian-15-amenazas-en-el-último-mes-contral%C3%ADderes-de-tierras-1.35712; David Bonilla, Denuncián Amenazas Contra Líderes de Restitución
de Tierras [Denounced Threats Against Land Restitution Leaders], SEMANA (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/denuncian-amenazas-contra-lideres-restitucion-tierras/2657693.
240
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
241
Presidente Santos Lamenta la Muerte de Líder de Restitución de Tierras [President Santos
Laments the Death of Land Restitution Leader], EL UNIVERSAL (June 17, 2012),
http://www.eluniversal.com.co/cartagena/nacional/presidente-santos-lamenta-muerte-de-lider-derestitucion-de-tierras-80539.
242
See Death Threats Against Advocates Claiming Land Restitution, supra note 239.
243
Id.
244
Id.; Bonilla, supra note 239.
245
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 1, 11; Rodriguez, supra note 14; Summers, supra note
158, at 219; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VICTIMS LAW A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note
203; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note 203;
Quiñones, supra note 148.
237
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the Law of Victims itself.246 The Law of Victims has created a new wave
of violence, resulting in killings and death threats against the victims and
land restitution leaders.247 So long as the internal conflict and violence
persists in Colombia, the warranty of no repetition will achieve nothing
more than symbolic efficacy. Such warranty is ideal for a post-conflict
environment, but the eradication of the internal conflict is currently
unforeseeable in Colombia.
C. The Landmine Problem
By October 2012, thirty-seven percent of reported victims who filed a
claim for land restitution were displaced by the FARC.248 The Minister of
Agriculture and Rural Development, Juan Camilo Restrepo, revealed that at
least seventy percent of the lands that were once under FARC control are
infected with antipersonnel mines.249 The presence of landmines presents a

246
Santos Is Called for Concrete Measures Against Anti-Restitution Armies, supra note 204;
Summers, supra note 158, at 219.
247
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 2-3; see also Colombia: Victims Face Reprisal for
Reclaiming
Land,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Sept.
17,
2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/colombia-victims-face-reprisals-reclaiming-land.
248
70% of Lands Abandoned by the Guerrillas may be Infected with Landmines, supra note 159.
249
Id.; Paula Delgado-Kling, Talking About Colombia: Stolen Land to be Returned to Original
Owners is Planted with Landmines (Oct. 16, 2012), http://talkingaboutcolombia.com/2012/10/16/stolenland-to-be-returned-to-original-owners-is-planted-with-landmines/; see also Valero, supra note 206.
Colombia is the only country in Latin America where landmines are still planted. Moloney, supra note
17, at 2013; see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Landmine Treaty: More Members, but Use Persists (Nov. 23,
2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/22/landmine-treaty-more-members-use-persists [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Landmine Treaty]. Landmines are amongst the indiscriminate weapons illegal
armed groups have used and continue to use in Colombia. Valero, supra note 206; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012, supra note 17. Illegal armed groups have used landmines since the mid1990s with the purpose of decimating their targets, instill terror in civilian populations, protect fields of
illicit plant cultivation, and attack offensive groups. CODHES, CODHES INFORMS, supra note 95; see also
Moloney, supra note 17. Landmines remain the guerrilla’s weapon of choice because they are easily
attainable and cheap. Moloney, supra note 17; see also Yilberto Lahuerta Percipiano, Impactos
Económicos Generados por el Uso de Minas Antipersonal en Colombia [Economic Impacts Generated
by the Use of Antipersonnel Landmines in Colombia], ARCHIVOS DE ECONOMIA 1 (2003), available at
https://www.dnp.gov.co/Portals/0/archivos/documentos/DEE/Archivos_Economia/235.pdf.
The socalled “foot breakers” cost about five dollars to make. Moloney, supra note 17. They are assembled in
homes and virtually undetectable by trained sniffer dogs. Id.; see also Lahuerta, supra note 249, at
1.Colombia has one of the highest numbers of landmine victims in the world. Moloney, supra note 17.
It has the highest number of new casualties reported every year. Id. By the end of 2012, a total of
10,001 individuals had fallen victim to landmines in Colombia. Delgado-Kling, supra note 249. Of
these, 2,098 have lost their lives. Id. An average of three people fall victim to landmines every day in
Colombia. Moloney, supra note 17. Between 1990 and 2002, the government spent $3.4 million dollars
on medical attention for the victims. Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 9. The number of landmine casualties
declined in 2007 for the first time in five years. Moloney, supra note 17. The annual casualty rate
dropped again by forty-four percent during the first three months of 2009. Id. By June 2009, over 220
new landmine casualties were reported. Id. The decreasing trend continued in 2011, with 120 new
casualties reported during the first seven months. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012,
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substantial impediment to the implementation of the Law for the following
reasons: it prevents restitution of the identified contaminated lands; it
threatens the safety of the victims, devalues their lands, and decreases
agricultural productivity; and it imposes a severe burden upon the
government to clear out the minefields.250
Restitution is not possible until the lands are cleared of landmines and
declared safe.251 In 2012, the government had not surveyed all areas it
suspected to be contaminated, thus ignoring the extent of landmine
contamination.252 Clearing landmines to ensure their suitability for
habitation will delay the victims’s return to their lands.253 Assuming that
the government restitutes unsurveyed lands, victims will likely refuse to
return after discovering that their lands may be infected, or may have been
infected with landmines.254
Milciades Garcia, for example, is a campesino who was forced to sell a
large tract of productive land for less than $6,000 dollars in the midst of
violent attacks.255 His previously owned 19.5 hectares of land in Montes de
María became attractive to the FARC for its varied elevations and close
proximity to bodies of water.256 The FARC committed multiple atrocities
on his land.257 They kidnapped and killed two of Milciades’s brothers and
several of his friends, including a close friend who Milciades found dead.258
The FARC also planted landmines in a portion of Milciades’s land that was
abandoned due to the violence.259 The landmines were planted strategically
to prevent the Colombian Army from entering into Milciades’s lands.260
Milciades witnessed a horse “exploding” and a soldier “reduced to pieces”

supra note 17. However, the number of casualties increased in 2012, with 328 new casualties reported
by October. Delgado-Kling, supra note 249.
In Colombia, people associate landmine victims with membership or participation with the armed
groups. Moloney, supra note 17. They assume the injuries occurred as a result of planting landmines.
Id. As a result, many casualties remain unreported due to ineffective databases and due to the fact that
victims rather remain silent than gain an ill fame.
250
See generally Lahuerta, supra note 249.
251
Delgado-Kling, supra note 249.
252
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, at 25-26 (2012),
available at http://www.the-monitor.org/lm/2012/resources/Landmine_Monitor_2012.pdf (hereinafter
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012); see also Moloney, supra
note 17, at 2014.
253
See, e.g., Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 19-20, 25.
254
See, e.g., Díaz, supra note 184.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
See id.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
See id.
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on his land after stepping on landmines.261 He affirms that he will not
return to his former land under any circumstances.262
The presence of landmines further prevents adequate restitution of the
victims by decreasing the value of the victims’s lands. Like Milciades,
many victims refuse to return to lands once in control of the FARC after
they learn about the presence of landmines.263 Similarly, the presence of
landmines will disinterest potential land buyers once the Law of Victims
allows the sale of the lands. The total value of lands abandoned by forced
displacement was approximately $3.7 million dollars in 2009.264 This value
will dramatically decrease, as the decrease in demand for lands results in a
decrease in their value.
Landmines not only affect the land value, but also the productivity of
the lands, which ultimately has a detrimental effect on the reparation of the
victims.265 The Law of Victims aims for the transformation of the land
market and the improvement of rural areas,266 which will generate a source
of income for the victims. Nonetheless, the existence of landmines hinders
such development.267 Land cannot be cultivated where landmines are
planted.268 Mine fields can obstruct agricultural areas of economic
activity.269 They can also block other areas that are crucial to the support or
furtherance of any economic activity.270 For instance, landmines can block
roads and highways, cattle and agricultural fields, and water sources
regularly used for agricultural purposes, or by the cattle industry.271 The
loss of land productivity, which results from landmines, accounts for ten to
eighteen percent of the total expenditure that the country bears in
connection with the insurgency’s use of landmines.272 Thus, even if the
victim opts to return to her land, the presence of landmines within her
territory, or in nearby areas, will interfere with the productivity of the land

261

Id.
Id.
263
See, e.g., id.
264
ACNUR, ALTO COMISIONADO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS REFUGIADOS (ACNUR),
LAS TIERRAS DE LA POBLACIÓN DESPLAZADA [LANDS OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION] (2009)
(Colom.),
available
at
http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/RefugiadosAmericas/Colombia/Las_tierras_de_la_pobl
acion_desplazada.pdf?view=1.
265
See Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 27-32.
266
Uprimmy-Yepes, supra note 183, at 308.
267
See generally Lahuerta, supra note 249.
268
ACNUR, LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, supra
note 252, at iii.
269
Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 27.
270
Id.
271
See id.
272
Id. at 38.
262
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and obstruct the economic advancement of the victim.
More importantly, those who opt for returning to unknowingly
contaminated lands are exposed to great danger. Individuals can easily fall
victim to landmines. Injuries caused by landmines range from mild injuries
to death.273 Landmine casualties occur in high rates in Colombia.274
Landmine injuries result in devastating effects to the victims, who often
lose limbs. It also increases the government’s cost in health care and
victims’s assistance. Further, landmine injuries result in costs related to the
loss of productivity of human capital.275 Such injuries cause the diminution
or loss of productive capacity of landmine victims who are physically
impaired and prevented from having a normal working life.276
Last, the presence of landmines obstructs the implementation of the
Law of Victims because the government faces the burden of demining the
victims’s lands. It drastically increases government expenses aimed at
efforts to clear out minefields. In some departments, the local governments
have already complained about the lack of funds to properly execute the
restitution plan.277 With the presence of landmines, the government will
incur additional costs that range between $200 and $1,000 for the removal
of a single landmine.278
The guerillas continue to plant landmines on a regular basis in areas
where they retain control.279 In September 2011, the Colombian Army
found 1,961 mines in the department of Putumayo, which had been planted
by the FARC.280 In February 2012, the Army seized forty-eight “fan
mines” from the FARC in the department of Caquetá.281
The FARC continues its use of landmines for the purposes of instilling

273

Id. at 33.
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
275
See Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 33.
276
See id.
277
See, e.g., Gómez Polo, supra note 137.
278
See Lahuerta, supra note 249, at 27. The cost of removal per landmine is 2.5 times greater in
Colombia than the international average. Id. The higher cost is due to the unique characteristics of most
homemade landmines planted in Colombia, which make them harder to detect. Id. These homemade
landmines are not made out of metal; thus, a metal detector would not locate them. Id. Also, the
explosives are covered with coffee or other products to make it extremely difficult for dogs to find. Id.
Last, these homemade landmines use different types of activation devices such as heat, light, and
movement. Id. This variation hinders the deminers’s performance since the method of deactivation
changes depending on the device. Id.
279
Moloney, supra note 17, at 2013; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012,
supra note 17; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra
note 203.
280
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note
203.
281
Id.
274
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terror and threatening communities.282 In 2011, for example, the explosion
of mines on the only road that leads to Samaniego, Nariño cut off the access
to the town.283 About a year later, in August 2012, the FARC distributed
pamphlets in the Putumayo town of San Miguel, informing the community
of the presence of landmines around the area.284 The threat resulted in the
confinement of the community.285
Approximately 328 people fell victim to landmines in 2012.286 Out of
these, fifty-four were killed, including eleven children.287 By the end of the
year, the Army had confiscated 3,882 kilograms of explosives in Putumayo,
an amount sufficient to assemble over 10,000 explosive devices.288 The
armed groups’s continued use of landmines obstructs the land restitution
process and the integral reparation of the victims.289
The government initiated its efforts of demining fields after it ratified
the Ottawa Treaty.290 Efforts to remove landmines in areas planted by the
military have proved somewhat successful.291 Twenty-two out of thirtythree military bases were demined by 2009.292 However, efforts in clearing
out mines remain in their early stages.293 Trained deminers are scarce in
Colombia.294 Also, the government still ignores the extent of the territory
that is contaminated with landmines.295 Only few maps indicating the
contaminated areas exist.296 The government possesses information
indicating that thirty-one of the thirty-two departments are contaminated,297
and it estimates that 660 municipalities are affected.298 However, all
suspected areas have yet to be surveyed.299 This lack of information on the
282

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Delgado-Kling, supra note 249.
Id.
See LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra

283
284
285
286
287
288

note 203.
289

See infra Part V (C).
Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014.
Id.; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, supra note

290
291
292
293
294
295

252, at 24.
296
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Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014.
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note
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LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, supra note 252,

203.
at 25.
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See id.; see also Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014.
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extent of contaminated areas hinders the government’s ability to create an
operational demining plan.300 Pursuant to its obligations under Article Five
of the Mine Ban Treaty, the government did not meet its 2011 deadline to
demine all contaminated areas in the country.301 It requested a ten-year
extension to meet its deadline, and anticipates that all areas will be cleared
out by then.302 Colombia created a 2011-2013 operational plan, which was
the central component of the request for extension.303 But, given the slow
progress of the current operational plan, meeting the extended deadline is
unlikely.304
So long as landmines are still present in the lands of the victims,
restitution of these lands is impossible. The government may proceed with
the restitution process in unsurveyed areas, but many victims will likely
refuse to return once they are aware of the possibility of landmine
contamination. Even if victims agree to return, the landmines diminish the
productivity of their lands, making it difficult for them to thrive financially
upon their return.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
In the interest of the victims of Colombia’s internal conflict, the Law
of Victims must be implemented in spite of its substantial challenges. The
internal conflict in Colombia originated from the economic and social
inequalities that resulted from the unequal distribution of land, and the
campesinos fought, and continue to fight, for land reform. Fifty years later,
the campesinos remain the most affected group as a result of the ongoing
conflict. Thus, it is imperative that the government adopt effective
measures to overcome challenges to the implementation of the Law of
Victims in order to achieve the “integral reparation” of the campesinos.
The proposed measures include: (1) effective implementation of programs
for the socioeconomic stabilization of the victims; (2) greater protection to
those involved in the process of land restitution and to communities at risk
of displacement; and (3) the improvement of demining efforts in areas
intended for restitution.
First, overcoming the challenge of granting victims integral reparation
by means of ensuring their socioeconomic stabilization upon return poses a
tremendous difficulty. The Law does not change the unequal distribution of
300
301

Id.
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE MONITOR 2012, supra note 252,

at 25.
302
303

Id. at 24.
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note

304

Id.

203.
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lands.305 Implementing a program that does nothing to cure such inequality
will altogether fail.306 Although the enactment of the Law of Victims
strives for progressive change, it serves as the government’s shield to
continue to reject land reform. A land restitution program that does nothing
to modify the unequal distribution of land tenure is less satisfactory than
land reform.307 But, given the current political situation in Colombia, a
program for land restitution is probably the only approach the government
will adopt in relation to land repatriation.308
To alleviate the problem of inequality arising from the current
distribution of land tenure, the government can complement restitution with
land grants that will positively affect the current pattern of land
The effectiveness of this plan depends upon the
distribution.309
government’s ability to acquire the lands to be distributed, through
grants.310 In order to ensure that the victims make the most of their lands,
the government must effectively oversee its programs. The Law of
Victims, along with its supplementing decrees, creates training programs,
grants, and credits aimed at the socioeconomic stabilization of the victims
upon return to their lands.311 Crucial to the success in achieving
socioeconomic stabilization of the victims is the effective implementation
and monitoring of these programs.
It is important that the victims’s return is incentivized, and not
forced.312 If the victims are forced to return, the government will achieve
the exact opposite of integral reparation. For example, in the event that a
bona fide owner occupies land intended for restitution, the Law of Victims
requires that the owner be paid the value of his land.313 The government
must then return the land to the victim.314 Yet the victim might prefer to
receive payment for the value of the land rather than take possession of the

305

See Attanasio et al., supra note 14, at 46.
Id.
307
Id.
308
See id.
309
Id. at 47.
310
Id. at 48.
311
See L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], arts. 51, 130-31; L. 4800/11,
diciembre 20, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], Title IV, Chp. I.
312
See Paula Jaramillo Vidales, Siendo Justos Mientras se Está Impartiendo Justicia: Ley de
Reparación de Tierras [Being unjust While Justice is Served: Law of Land Restitution], LA SILLA
VACÍA (May 12, 2011), http://www.lasillavacia.com/elblogueo/blogoeconomia/24271/siendo-injustomientras-se-esta-impartiendo-justicia-ley-de-reparacion [hereinafter Jaramillo, Law of Land Restitution].
313
Paula Jaramillo Vidales, Nobel en Economía: Asignación Bilateral y Estabilidad Aplicada
[Nobel in Economy: Bilateral Assignment and Applied Stability], EL ESPECTADOR (Colom.), Oct. 21,
2012, available at http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/articulo-382455-nobel-economiaasignacion-bilateral-y-estabilidad-aplicada [hereinafter Jaramillo, Nobel in Economy].
314
Id.
306
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land.315
In a survey conducted in 2004, only ten percent of victims expressed a
desire to return to their lands.316 However, the Law of Victims does not
provide victims with this alternative.317 It grants monetary compensation
only in the event that the government cannot acquire the victim’s land and
there are no alternative lands with similar characteristics that can be
conveyed to the victim.318 In like manner, the Law of Victims precludes
victims from selling the land within two years after restitution.319 In such
event, the implementation of the Law of Victims is not achieving justice or
integral reparation, for it is subjecting the victim to return to her land
against her will.320
Integral reparation requires the government to take into consideration
the victims’s desires in implementing the restitution program, which is
viable without bearing additional execution costs.321 The solution entails
offering the victims an alternative option.322 For instance, the government
can put the victim on notice that her land is under the possession of an
owner who obtained the land through legal means.323 Once the government
assesses the cost of the land and determines that the current possessor is a
bona fide owner, it can offer the victim the option to choose payment over
possession of the land.324 This way, the victim’s desires are taken into
account, while bearing no additional expenses for land restitution.325
Second, the Law of Victims provides a warranty of no repetition,
which guarantees to the victims that they will not be subjects of a second
instance of forced displacement. However, making such a utopian warranty
deviated from the reality in Colombia, where the internal conflict persists.
So long as the internal conflict persists in Colombia, achieving such
warranty is not feasible. The warranty of no repetition is ideal for a postconflict environment and, since the conflict is far from over, it achieves
pure symbolic significance on its face.

315

Id.
Jaramillo, Law of Land Restitution, supra note 312.
317
See Jaramillo, Nobel in Economy, supra note 313.
318
See L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], art. 72 (providing that the
government must first attempt to recover the victim’s land; if this in not possible, the government will
give the victim a land with similar characteristics to her original land; and, if none of the foregoing are
possible, it will give monetary compensation to the victim as a last resource).
319
Id., art. 101.
320
Jaramillo, Nobel in Economy, supra note 313.
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
See id.
324
Id.
325
Id.
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While the government cannot guarantee the non-recurrence of forced
displacement, it can nonetheless adopt measures to better protect the
victims, land restitution leaders, and communities at risk of displacement
from violence. Further, it can afford greater protection to victims initiating
their land claims. Land claimants are being threatened and intimidated. As
a result, many of them refrain from proceeding with their claims. Thus, the
government must provide individualized protection to the victims receiving
threats in connection with their claims for lands.
For example, the government can establish protection plans and
consult with returning communities, or communities at risk of
displacement, to incorporate their specific needs into the plan.326 In the
case of returning or returned communities, the Ministry of Interior should
create an emergency reaction protocol to be implemented by local
authorities.327 In requiring local authorities to provide twenty-four hour
protection to returning or returned communities, local authorities are
engaged in the restitution process.328
As to communities at risk of displacement, the protection plan that is
specially formulated to address their particular needs should include
investigations of threats and abuses.329 In addition, the protection plan
should establish an army patrol along the boundaries of the community.330
The plan should also include measures for investing in rural development
projects that are community-based, and measures to ensure adequate access
to the community through roads or bridges.331 The government must also
(properly and rapidly) recognize and legalize land title.332
Twenty-four hour protection is also necessary for land restitution
leaders who are often the subjects of death threats and victims of murder.333
The murders of sixty-seven land restitution leaders remain unpunished.334
The threats, attacks, and murders must be promptly investigated and
prosecuted.335 Only prompt investigations and prosecutions can deter
subsequent attacks.336
Lastly, the government should improve its demining efforts in areas

326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336

HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 19.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
President Santos Laments the Death of Land Restitution Leader, supra note 241.
HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 15, at 19.
Id.
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intended for restitution. It should survey these areas to determine whether
they are contaminated with landmines in order to establish an operational
plan.337 Once the affected areas are properly identified, the government
should prioritize these areas in its operational plan and conduct the survey.
Demining platoons should mark and fence the zones planted with
landmines in the interim between identification and demining, in order to
ensure the exclusion of potential victims, as soon as the affected areas are
properly identified.338
Such efforts should also be aimed at areas where communities are at
risk of displacement. Injuries resulting from landmines force victims to flee
their homes.339 Thus, preventive measures are essential to avoid further
displacement. Upon surveying and fencing contaminated areas, the
government should inform civilians in nearby communities of the presence
of landmines.340
The burden of overcoming the landmine problem is substantial, since
demining programs are expensive.341 Also, these efforts are being
conducted while the armed groups continue to plant landmines.342
Demining efforts across the entire country may be moving slowly, and the
set deadlines are unlikely to be met.343 Nevertheless, implementing an
effective operational plan that prioritizes the areas intended for restitution
or at risk of displacement is feasible.
In 2011, Colombia declared the mine clearance of seventy-four areas
covering 329,950 m2 where the Army is not actively engaged in operations
against armed groups.344 Nine municipalities, which comprised these areas,
were cleared and declared safe in one year. Also, the government counts on
the aid of international and non-governmental organizations, as well as the

337
Demining efforts have been hindered by the lack of information regarding the affected mine
areas. Moloney, supra note 17, at 2014; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA:
MINE BAN POLICY, supra note 203; LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, LANDMINE
MONITOR 2012, supra note 252, at 25. The government, aided by international and non-governmental
organizations, has yet to survey all suspected areas. Id.
338
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MAIMING THE PEOPLE: GUERILLA USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL
LANDMINES AND OTHER INDISCRIMINATE WEAPONS IN COLOMBIA 3 (2007), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/colombia0707webwcover.pdf.
339
See, e.g., id. at 12.
340
See id. at 3.
341
See Ana María Arango Dominguez, Colombia’s Landmine Crisis, HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE
NETWORK (HPN) (2009), available at http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue45/colombias-landmine-crisis.
342
See id.
343
See LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra
note 203.
344
See id.
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support from foreign governments, in ongoing demining efforts.345 The
United States, for example, granted $1.9 million for the funding of the
demining plan.346 Canada provided additional funding in the amount of
$1.6 million for projects including integral humanitarian mine action.347
VII. CONCLUSION
The Law of Victims and Land Restitution faces significant challenges.
Despite its substantial obstacles, the implementation of the Law of Victims
is crucial to the adequate reparation for the victims, who have been, and
continue to be, the most affected by the conflict. Certainly, eradicating the
internal conflict is nearly impossible. Nonetheless, the government can
adopt measures to initiate a change in the pattern of socioeconomic
inequalities, which can eventually end the vicious cycle of the internal
conflict. By reducing the socioeconomic inequalities and ensuring the
victims’s socioeconomic stabilization upon return, the government will
eliminate the conditions of inequality that originated the internal conflict in
the first place. Also, it achieves the integral reparation of the victims by
ensuring their economic stabilization. The government could do so if the
program for land restitution is properly supplemented with a program for
land grants. That way, the government engages in active measures to
change the unequal distribution of land ownership, a distribution that
creates an environment of inequality, allowing for the economic
advancement of the victims.
Since it is not feasible to eradicate the internal conflict in Colombia,
the government should, at the very least, offer more protection to the
victims seeking restitution. In addition, it should establish effective plans to
protect returned communities, as well as communities at risk of
displacement. The government must promptly investigate and prosecute
threats and attacks against the victims, innocent communities, and land
restitution leaders for future deterrence of such threats and attacks. Last,
the government cannot realistically prevent the continued use of landmines
by illegally armed groups, but it can prioritize its demining programs in
areas intended for restitution. That way, the safety of the returning victim is
ensured, and land production and rural development are not hindered by the
presence of landmines.

345 See id.; Canada Announces More Support for Land Restitution in Colombia, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
AND
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
CANADA
(Nov.
14,
2012),
http://www.international.gc.ca/media/state-etat/newscommuniques/2012/11/14a.aspx?lang=eng&view=d.
346 LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, COLOMBIA: MINE BAN POLICY, supra note
203.
347 Canada Announces More Support for Land Restitution in Colombia, supra note 345.

